MARINES AS AN ENDANGERED SPECIES

A Book Review by
C.P. Neimeyer

The Marine Corps' Search for a Mission: 1880–1898
by Jack Shulimson
Modern war studies series.
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

Camp Osceola, Magnolia Bluff, Pensacola, 1888.
U.S. Marine Corps Museum

Marines are so commonly accepted as an "elite" that such classification has long been taken for granted by the public. However, Jack Shulimson's study uncovers a time when the Corps was not so highly regarded. The author is not a revisionist seeking to tear down a service reputation. Instead, he deftly progresses beyond mere revision to write a history about the Marine Corps in the late 19th century that will no doubt be a widely-referred-to institutional study for years to come.

Shulimson describes the rise of Marine professionalism and the Corps' transition into the 20th century as an integral part of the Armed Forces. He begins after the Civil War and traces the institutional development by analyzing the efforts of various commandants and officers to reform themselves and defend the existence of their service during a period of major change in America.

The Corps fell into disarray in the late 1870s and was unsure of its role in national defense. With an officer corps of only 75 and a reputation as an ill-defined organization, a group of Marine reformers among the younger officers demanded either a "funeral or a resuscitation" for their once proud organization. Fortunately, the Corps chose resuscitation, although some reforms were neither internally generated nor universally appreciated.

Starting with "The Old Corps, 1865–1880," Shulimson interprets the trials and tribulations of reformers such as Captains Henry Clay Cochrane and Robert Huntington and First Lieutenant Daniel Pratt Mannix. Being called a *young reformer* in that period was indeed a relative term. Henry Cochrane spent his first 18 years of service as a lieutenant.

Not only was promotion slow, but the Corps was saddled with numerous superannuated officers who were not concerned about reform nor future doctrine. Cochrane noted, for example, that some officers contented themselves "with keeping quiet" and "clandestinely prowling around the Capitol in citizens' clothes to avoid observation" while gathering certificates of character from naval officers for use in furthering their careers. A patronage system for promotion was endemic throughout the Corps and many saw Marine officers as dandies or ne'er-do-wells who had been unable to gain appointments to West Point or Annapolis. Cochrane observed that during the single year of 1880 one officer had been killed in a riding accident, another sent home "insane," and still another dismissed for cause. Philadelphia police arrested a Marine major for drunkenly accosting women in the streets while a Navy court-martial cashiered a colonel for "conduct unbecoming an officer."

Despite these internal problems, the greatest push for reform did not come from the likes of Henry Clay Cochrane, but from the Navy. Writing in the *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, naval officers began to stress landing operations and speculated about the influence of such operations on both services. Contrary to what one might expect, surprisingly few Marines appeared concerned about advanced base operations. Shulimson notes that this deficiency of vision probably had more to do with a lack of a coherent Corps-wide unifying theme or doctrine than anything else.

The author gives much credit to the creation of the Naval War College and commissioning of large numbers of officers from among graduates of the Naval Academy for

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the establishment of a more professional Corps. The two institutions furnished Marine officers with a legitimacy that had been previously lacking in its officer corps. Moreover, the Naval War College provided the initial venue for gaming fleet operations and suggested various options for utilizing the Corps in future operations. Older Marine officers still preferred the status quo—detailing marines to man the secondary batteries on ships—but at least some advanced the reforms proposed by younger officers which were starting to be debated at the Naval War College and in the *Proceedings*. All these arguments may have continued for decades had the Nation not emerged as a global power following the Spanish-American War.

The war with Spain was a roles and functions watershed for the Corps. Expansion and acquisition of overseas assets had more impact on the Marines than any institution or reformer. The author notes that the United States found it easier to seize Spanish possessions than to decide what to do with them. As Cochrane noted in 1898, "the establishment of a colonial empire suggests foreign service duty for all grades of the Marine Corps." Now, instead of piecemealing marines as shipboard detachments, Colonel Commandant Charles Heywood proposed a 20,000-man force of "well drilled and equipped marines" able to sail at a moment's notice and respond to world trouble spots "without the necessity of calling on the Army." Corps relations with the Navy had come full circle because of improved Marine utility in the eyes of naval strategists. In essence the naval establishment had finally accorded the Corps its own professional jurisdiction: advanced base operations.

If there is one drawback to Shulimson's fine study it is his sole focus on the Marine officer corps. He almost totally neglects the enlisted ranks. For example, during the period covered the Marines experienced an extraordinarily high rate of desertion among its enlisted component. Yet in a single action in 1871 on the Korean peninsula, six of its members were awarded the Medal of Honor. There must have been other reasons for this discrepancy in behavior but Shulimson's work avoids that sort of question which is unfortunate because inclusion of primary source material from enlisted men frequently reveals differing views from those of officers.

This is a scholarly and thoroughly researched book that is a joy to read. In shedding light on a heretofore largely unknown portion of Marine Corps history, Shulimson clearly demonstrates just how formative this period was. It reveals interesting parallels between the late 19th century Corps-wide search for a service niche in the military establishment and the uncertainty that exists over that issue today in some circles. It should be required reading for all naval officers. JFQ

MEDITERRANEAN WARFARE IN 3D

A Book Review by
Brian R. Sullivan

The Lost Battle: Crete, 1941
by Callum MacDonald
New York: The Free Press, 1993.
350 pp. $24.95.
[ISBN 0–02–919625–6]

A ferocious battle raged around, over, and on Crete from May 10 to June 1, 1941. First the *Luftwaffe* relentlessly bombed the Greek island and British warships offshore for ten days; and then combined German airborne, airlanding, and seaborne forces engaged determined resistance by the Royal Navy, Commonwealth and Greek armies, and a large portion of the local population. When the brutal combat ended the *Wehrmacht* had captured the island and taken 12,000 prisoners. The Germans killed some 2,000 members of the Commonwealth forces, wounded another 2,000 men, sank nine Royal Navy ships and severely damaged six more (which took the lives of 2,000 British sailors in the process), and downed nearly fifty Royal Air Force (RAF) aircraft. Moreover, the invaders killed many Cretan civilians and Greek soldiers, then shot another 2,000 Cretans in the aftermath of the invasion. But the Germans also suffered heavily, losing 3,400 men dead and 3,300 wounded, and the destruction of nearly 200 Ju–52 transports.

The murderous nature of the fight can be gauged by comparing these appalling casualties with the limited size of the ground forces engaged. On the Allied side there were one Australian, one British, and two New Zealand brigades along with a reinforced battalion–sized unit of Royal Marines and eleven badly trained and poorly equipped Greek infantry battalions. They faced one paratroop and one mountain division of Germans. In fact, the Battle of Crete cost the *Wehrmacht* more losses than the entire Balkan Campaign. In *The Lost Battle*, Callum MacDonald recounts this gripping story in a superlative manner, creating what will surely become the definitive history of that bloody encounter.

Among the many virtues of the book is its multi–dimensional quality. It proceeds by stages from strategy to operations and tactics. Though the emphasis is on ground combat, the author also describes the air and naval aspects of the battle in fascinating detail. *The Lost Battle* begins with a short but authoritative account of the development of airborne warfare by the *Luftwaffe*, under the eye of General Kurt Student, then smoothly fits that story into the context of Hitler's strategy from the summer of 1940 to the spring of 1941. In turn, Hitler's plans for his European war leads to an examination of Churchill's strategy of defeating the Axis in the Mediterranean and his commitment of forces to defend Greece. A short

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Crete: Allied Dispositions on May 20, 1941

Source: D.M. Davin, *Crete. Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, 1939–45* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953).

but exciting narrative of the disastrous British campaign in Greece carries the reader to Churchill's decision on the defense of Crete.

Churchill learned on April 27, 1941 through an Ultra decrypt of a *Luftwaffe* Enigma signal that the Germans intended to launch a simultaneous airborne and seaborne invasion of Crete. The next day he told General Archibald Wavell, his ground forces commander in the Mediterranean and Middle East, "It ought to be a fine opportunity for killing parachute troops. The island must be stubbornly defended." Despite the precise intelligence about German operational plans which came from Ultra sources in the following days, Churchill took no chances. He "suggested" to Wavell that command of forces on Crete be entrusted to Major General Bernard Freyberg of New Zealand.

Was there ever such a man? Freyberg's reckless valor and magnificent physique (he swam the English Channel at the age of 36) combined with genuine modesty to make him a legend before his thirtieth birthday. His early years hardly suggested such a destiny, for he honored his parents' wish to become a dentist. But his lust for risk and excitement drove him to abandon that stable career and to wander the earth in search of adventure. When World War I broke out he rushed to London and joined the British army. In 1915 he swam ashore from the invasion fleet off Gallipoli to light false landing beacons to deceive the Turks. In 1916 he won the Victoria Cross for his role in capturing the Beaucourt redoubt on the Western Front. Severely wounded, he was left for dead and only survived by a near miracle. Freyberg demanded return to combat on recovery despite suffering severe wounds. By the Armistice he had been wounded seriously eight more times and thrice awarded the Distinguished Service Order. At 27 he had risen to the rank of brigadier. With the Royal Marines, Black Watch, King's Royal Rifles, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, tough New Zealanders and Australians, and precise Ultra intelligence, could Freyberg fail to hold Crete?

But it did fall, and MacDonald's detailed explanation of how and why—despite all the advantages enjoyed by Commonwealth forces—provides the basic fascination of *The Lost Battle*. The lesson that emerges is not new but bears repeating: war is the most complicated of all human activities and success or failure can hinge on any one of a myriad of factors. Freyberg had many advantages and got almost everything right. His few mistakes, however, proved fatal.

To begin, Freyberg himself doubted that he could hold Crete and thus entered the fray with little confidence. RAF fighter cover that might have been available was largely lost over Greece or destroyed prior to evacuation. Of the few British fighters left to defend Crete most were lost in the first days of the air battle leading up to the invasion. The five surviving aircraft escaped to Egypt twenty-four hours beforehand which prevented the Royal Navy from safeguarding the island from amphibious attack. British ships could avoid *Luftwaffe* bombing only at night. Thus, Freyberg could rely only on ground forces to repel invaders but they would be subjected to constant German air strikes by day.

Worse, Freyberg failed to augment his ground forces. The Special Operations Executive, created by Churchill to "set Europe ablaze"

with insurgency, sabotage, and subversion, had sent a highly skilled agent named John Pendlebury to Crete in mid–1940. Despite Greek neutrality until Italy attacked in October, Pendlebury set about organizing a Cretan underground to resist an enemy invasion; but his efforts were hampered by lack of official support even after the evacuation of the Greek mainland. When the matter was finally brought to Freyberg's attention, he recoiled from the unconventional idea of arming civilians. Motivated by fierce patriotism the Cretans, even without British arms to make their guerrilla war more effective, resisted the Germans tenaciously.

Freyberg's final mistake was to deploy as much to check an amphibious assault as against an airborne landing. His son later claimed that Wavell had refused to give his father permission to move forces so as not to compromise Ultra. About ten days before the German landing, Enigma intercepts indicated that the bulk of the invasion force would arrive by air. According to the story, Wavell decided Ultra intelligence was worth more than Crete and that moving Freyberg's forces at the last minute could alert Germany that its operational code had been broken. But Freyberg's later actions suggest he really did fear a seaborne attack since he believed that the Royal Navy could not effectively oppose one. Thus, he placed forces along the beaches that otherwise might have held the vital airfield at Maleme.

Nonetheless, German paratroops jumped to disaster when they began landing on May 20. Ultra had given Freyberg precise advance warning of the drop and information to position many of his units and anti–aircraft guns. The local Cretan people enthusiastically joined in the slaughter of the descending Germans; and slaughter it was according to MacDonald. Commonwealth forces and Cretans killed most wounded or surrendering airborne troops who they encountered. The German parachutes lacked toggle lines and could not be maneuvered, so many Germans drifted helplessly into Commonwealth positions or villages where they were dispatched without mercy. Tortured by thirst in the ferocious heat of the Cretan day, often unarmed because their weapons containers were dropped separately, surviving paratroops fell back into defensive perimeters. There they watched successive waves of German transport planes come under accurate anti-aircraft fire, then explode in the air or crash in flames. Despite heavy *Luftwaffe* bombing and strafing, Freyberg's men gained the upper hand. By evening the Germans held only the edge of one airfield at Maleme, vital to Student's plan to reinforce his desperate paratroops with mountain troops flown in aboard Ju–52s.

But the outcome of the battle was decided on the night of May 20 by two New Zealand brigade commanders. Freyberg based his defense on immediate, vigorous counterattack to regain any airfield or portion thereof seized by German paratroops. In the dark the Germans lacked their single advantage of close air support and the Commonwealth forces had superior numbers in the Maleme sector. But Freyberg's brigadiers held fast to World War I attitudes that put husbanding reserves and holding a solid defensive line before the need to counterattack. If they had committed the reserves the airfield at Maleme would have been cleared of Germans. But the New Zealanders feared attack from the sea and would not strip coastal defenses to reinforce night attacks that came close to success. When dawn came the Germans still held part of the field and hill overlooking it.

Even so, shelling of the Maleme airstrip prevented a German airlanding until late afternoon. When Student's remaining reserve battalion was dropped instead to reinforce Maleme, half of the paratroopers drifted into New Zealand positions and were virtually annihilated. Dozens more fell into the Mediterranean and drowned. Perhaps as late as midafternoon of May 21, a concerted New Zealand assault might have overrun the field. But Stukas and Me–109s bombed and strafed the Commonwealth troops at will and their commanders decided not to attack under such pounding. By late in the day German air transports began flying in the 5th Mountain Division.

Freyberg hardly realized he had lost the battle. In fact, on the night of May 21, the Royal Navy took advantage of the darkness to evade the *Luftwaffe* and then scatter a German invasion convoy approaching Crete. Only the extraordinary heroism of Commander Francesco Mimbelli of the Italian torpedo boat *Lupo* saved the Germans from slaughter. Mimbelli engaged three British light cruisers at point–blank range, taking 18 six–inch hits but driving off the warships before they could sink all the transports and machine-gun helpless survivors in the water. Most Germans were eventually pulled from the Aegean but the amphibious assault had been smashed and a subsequent attempt was canceled. For Freyberg, the crisis appeared to have passed.

Meanwhile the Allied commander ordered a night attack on Maleme airfield that continued to the next morning. Yet still fearing an amphibious assault he did not commit all available reserves. The battle tipped back and forth though Commonwealth forces lacked sufficient strength to overcome the desperate German defense. Even as heavy fighting raged along the edge of the field, the Germans continued to fly in mountain troops. By late on May 22, Freyberg realized that over the previous twenty-four hours the course of events had swung decisively against him. The Germans had built up enough strength that they could not be dislodged from Maleme and could now fly in as many reinforcements as desired. Reluctantly, Freyberg ordered a retreat that he knew could only end in the evacuation of the island.

In the next three days enough German troops airlanded to begin a major offensive drive. They also proceeded to shoot hundreds of Cretan civilians in retaliation for resisting the invasion. On May 27, Freyberg

ordered an amphibious withdrawal starting the following night. Luckily for the Commonwealth forces the *Luftwaffe* had begun deployment from Greece to the Soviet frontier in preparation for Operation Barbarossa. Still, many ships and troops were lost to air attack as the Royal Navy carried out a four–night evacuation. The last troops embarked in the early morning hours of June 1. But thousands were abandoned who might have been saved. Ultra decrypts had not yet indicated that the *Luftwaffe* was flying out of its Greek bases and the Royal Navy believed that it could not afford to lose more warships off Crete. Some Commonwealth troops managed to escape Crete in small boats while others took to the hills to join the Cretan resistance. But most of the remaining defenders of Crete surrendered to the Germans during early June.

This battle offers many lessons. One is that control of the sea matters less than control of the air, although Churchill refused to accept that fact until he lost *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* off Malaya six months after the battle for Crete should have made it clear. A more surprising lesson is that near-perfect intelligence did not result in victory for Commonwealth forces. Operational skill outweighed the advantages of knowing enemy plans and intentions. Churchill expected Freyberg to achieve a miracle. But the New Zealander, for all his personal virtues, was only a man and had subordinates and units distinctly inferior to their German opponents.

Nonetheless the outcome could have been far worse for the Allies. Combing the battlefield for documents after the battle, German intelligence found the first page of a British Ultra decrypt. The Germans had deduced that Freyberg knew in advance of the timing and place of their airdrops, but not how the information had come to him. Now they held the answer in their hands. Luckily for the Allied cause the Germans failed to analyze this evidence, instead deciding that an espionage ring in Greece had gotten the plans. For all the tragedies that befell Commonwealth forces on and off Crete, they were of little consequence compared with the terrible consequences that would have resulted from a German discovery of the Ultra secret in June 1941. JFQ

UNDER FOUR ENSIGNS

A Book Review by
W. Spencer Johnson

Men of War: Great Naval Captains of World War II
edited by Stephen Howarth.
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
602 pp. $25.00
[ISBN 0–312–08844–2]

This impressive tome edited by Stephen Howarth belongs in the library of every student of modern warfare. The collection of essays portrays the roles played during the six years of World War II by 30 naval officers and one Marine. Drawn from the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, the British Royal Navy, and the German and Japanese navies, the personae who sail across the pages reflect command on the broad strategic level, at fleet and task group level, and in individual ships. Also portrayed are several whose contributions were incalculable, although they occupied staff and support roles. In addition to the professional challenges faced by these exceptional naval leaders, readers are afforded fascinating insights into the personal traits of these leaders and the career paths that brought them to positions of command and responsibility during the war.

The authors of several essays in this collection knew their subjects personally and provide unique perspectives. Peter Kemp's portrait of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound as First Sea Lord is richer for having served under Pound in the Admiralty's Operational Intelligence Center. E.B. Potter not only served with Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz at Pearl Harbor, but later collaborated with Nimitz in producing a history of sea power from ancient times to the modern era. David Rosenberg, who is currently at work on a biography of Admiral Arleigh Burke, has a long and close personal relationship with his subject. We are clearly beneficiaries of these associations.

The book is divided into top brass, air admirals, amphibious admirals, submariners, anti-submariners, tactical and general, and a final category entitled "The Ones the Navies Ignore." It is in the last section that we meet Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, USMC, a great Pacific War commander; Vice Admiral Ben Morul, USN, founder of the Seabees; Admiral John Godfrey, Royal Navy, an intelligence giant; and Captain Joseph Rockefort, USN, a code breaker who made the victory at Midway possible. The crucial contributions of Godfrey and Rockefort to the success of the war at sea during its dark early days were singularly unrecognized in the glow of bureaucratic politics which even the heroic atmosphere of the period could not submerge.


U.S. Navy

Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey

Captain W. Spencer Johnson, USN (Ret.), taught military strategy and operations at the National War College and earlier commanded a destroyer squadron.

We learn of Sir Dudley Pound's steady hand at the helm of the Royal Navy in the Med, the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and later in the Pacific. Providing operational intelligence and broad direction to forces at sea, he consistently left the command, control, and tactical direction of forces afloat to his commanders. One exception was his order to Convoy PQ17 to scatter when evidence of overpowering surface, subsurface, and air threats spelled doom for this convoy to north Russia. Battling the Axis at sea, the attentions of Churchill in London, and a brain tumor that took his life in 1943, Pound countered the threat to Britain's life lines around the world, thereby ensuring his nation's survival from the menace at sea and supporting Allied efforts in the bleak days of the war.

Pound's American counterpart, Fleet Admiral Ernest King, was an entirely different animal. King took a very direct hand in operations, guiding efforts in the Atlantic to counter the German U-boat offensive which took a dreadful toll on the East Coast in 1942. In the Pacific he was involved in planning strategy and fleet operations at every stage. He fully exercised his offices as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet; Chief of Naval Operations; and Commander of the Tenth Fleet, the latter position charged with the escort and routing of American convoys. The essay on King is by Robert Love of the History Department at the Naval Academy. Love treats his subject with due veneration but expounds his views as well, some mistaken, about strategy and decisions regarding the war. For instance, Love advances the idea that a landing should have been made in France in 1942. He states:

Churchill's preference for a grand strategy of dispersion and Roosevelt's vacillation thus condemned the Allies to wasteful, peripheral operations in the Mediterranean for two years. It unwittingly allowed the Soviets so to improve their position on the Eastern Front that they were ready to overrun Central Europe in 1944 when the Americans finally invaded France; and it gave the Germans at least twenty-four months to construct the formidable defenses of Normandy.

Love reaches this conclusion despite the fact that shipping, especially assault shipping, was in extremely short supply in early 1942; that the strategic air campaign in Europe was barely underway so Allied forces could not even begin to contest air superiority anywhere in Europe; that U-boats ruled the Atlantic; that U.S. and British troops, newly raised and trained, were green and untested in combat; and that joint and combined organizations were yet to be refined. A landing on the coast of France in the fall of 1942 would probably have resulted in the forces being repulsed or a siege of any enclave seized that would have ended in an Allied reversal, at best a second Dunkirk. Equally disastrous results would have ensued in the Mediterranean and South Pacific, from which resources would have been diverted. The long debate over a return to the Continent in 1942 does need airing, with the advocates of opposing views making their cases once and for all. From this reviewer's perspective, the British were right: a cross-channel attack in 1942 was simply not on.

Howarth's portrait of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, a naval and grand strategist of the first order, is first-rate. A surface officer who became a convert to the emerging capabilities of naval aviation late in his career, he built up the Imperial Navy's carrier striking arm and successfully and boldly demonstrated it at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean and South Pacific during 1941–42. He remained a battleship sailor, however, true to Mahan, as his strategy and tactics for Midway illustrate. He shared much in common with King and Halsey in his advocacy of pre-war naval aviation, yet was equally at home with battleship admirals and their belief in the decisive battle at sea. Unlike his American counterparts, Yamamoto had to navigate the tricky waters of Japanese interwar politics, truly a feat of daring for a senior officer opposed to Japan's rampant militarism and the prospect of war with America. Yamamoto was convinced that Japan could not win such a conflict if it went beyond six months or a year. Howarth cites Yamamoto as Japan's greatest naval leader since Togo.

Admirals Nimitz and Spruance emerge as the architects of the victory in the Pacific, while Germany's Raeder and Donetz are portrayed as the admirals who contested control of the Atlantic, only to lose perhaps as much for political reasons as ill-conceived or poorly executed operations at sea. An apolitical and highly professional Raeder is contrasted to the operationally and strategically gifted Donetz, an ardent National Socialist. The same contrast appears between two superb U-boat commanders. Lieutenant Commander Otto Kretschmer was a reserved, energetic officer who felt that the military should be apolitical and took exception to taking a personal oath to Adolph Hitler when he declared himself Fuhrer in 1934. Kretschmer was the first U-boat commander to sink over 250,000 GRT of shipping before being sunk himself in 1941 and spending the rest of the war in Canada as a POW. His compatriot, Lieutenant Commander Gunther Prian, was a hero who crept into Scapa Flow and sank Britain's *Royal Oak*, plus another 174,000 GRT, before he was lost and became the darling of Nazi propaganda for his exploits early in the war.

The book contains a wealth of knowledge on joint warfare. This is perhaps best illustrated in John Winton's essay on Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Andrew Cunningham who succeeded Pound as First Sea Lord. While commander in the Mediterranean, Cunningham had responsibility for supporting the British army in Greece and on Crete. In the hard fighting that ensued, the fleet lost two aircraft carriers to battle damage from air attacks, three battleships, four cruisers, and four destroyers. Two cruisers and six destroyers were sunk. All but overwhelmed by the Germans, General Wavell, army commander in the Middle East, told Cunningham that the army expected no more of his ships and that he was relieved of further responsibility. Cunningham told Wavell that he would go on; he would not let the army down. "There was a tradition that had to be upheld," he re-

sponded. "It took three years to build a ship. It would take three hundred to rebuild a tradition." Despite the loss of two more cruisers, a total of 16,500 British troops were evacuated from Crete, and the tradition of interservice support was upheld.

Under amphibious commanders, operations in North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, and Normandy are highlighted, along with those conducted in the island-hopping amphibious warfare that was the Pacific. In the Atlantic, Army divisions, schooled in techniques learned at the Atlantic Amphibious Warfare School established by Major General Holland M. Smith, splashed ashore to seize beaches, like their Marine counterparts did in the Pacific. Admirals such as Richard Conolly and Kent Hewitt learned the art of amphibious warfare in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, as did their counterparts half a world away. Conolly, a naval commander at Sicily and Salerno, was later transferred to share his combat-honed skills in amphibious planning and operations with the Pacific Fleet. His fighting spirit for close range naval gunfire support earned him the nickname "close-in Conolly" and the undying respect of marines and soldiers he supported so well. His spirit of joint cooperation was no less remarkable, as described by one British visitor to his pre-Sicilian invasion headquarters.

The attitude there was not one of educating the Army to an understanding of naval limitations . . . it was rather a complete and generous appreciation that the Army had the sticky end of the job, and that somehow or other the Navy would find ways of seeing them through, and of implementing any landing plan dictated by the tactical needs of the military task.

This is the essence of jointness—the spirit of dedication to joint warfighting goals as evidenced by Cunningham and Conolly—that is at the heart of any joint or combined operation and organization.

This impressive collection is not without its flaws. With almost thirty authors, the essays vary in length and style. Many are documented, some are not—this reviewer wishes they all were. The book would have benefitted from proofreading by a naval hand to catch those little annoyances such as describing an LST as a ship which lands troops instead of tanks. With authors of various nationalities treating a number of navies, notes on differences in organizational structure would be useful to the reader. For instance, an Imperial Japanese Navy destroyer division was comprised of a cruiser and 15 destroyers—a large squadron or flotilla by Western standards. But these few flaws are minor in a work of immense value and pass easily in the reader's wake.

Finally, while awed by the personages presented one wishes some other officers had been included in this work. Missing is Fleet Admiral William Leahy, Roosevelt's chief of staff and, de facto, first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Hart of the Asiatic Fleet is also missing. Admiral Sir Percy Noble, who commanded Royal Navy forces engaged in the battle of the Atlantic during 1940–41, is not portrayed, nor is his successor, Max Horton, who would witness the victory over the U-boats. No Italian naval officers are included despite their operations in the Mediterranean and pioneering underwater swimming attacks against the Royal Navy in Alexandria—feats emulated by the British and American navies later in the war and the precursor to SEAL operations. Again, this reviewer could only wish for an even longer book. It is also interesting to note that many, indeed most of the officers depicted achieved their greatness long after today's mandatory retirement age. Some in fact came out of retirement, a lesson worth pondering.

Men of War is a book to be savored and treasured. Lessons in joint and combined warfare, fighting spirit and operational flexibility, and leadership are all there between the covers of this volume. It should be part of every thinking soldier's, sailor's, marine's, and airman's seabag or barracks bag if not his or her knapsack. **JFQ**

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

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